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APPLYING FOURIER ANALYSIS TO JUDGMENT
AGGREGATION
YAN X ZHANG
Abstract. The classical Arrow’s Theorem answers “how can n voters obtain a col-
lective preference on a set of outcomes, if they have to obey certain constraints?”
We give an analogue in the judgment aggregation framework of List and Pettit,
answering “how can n judges obtain a collective judgment on a set of logical propo-
sitions, if they have to obey certain constraints?” We abstract this notion with
the concept of normal pairs of functions on the Hamming cube, which we analyze
with Fourier analysis and elementary combinatorics. We obtain judgment aggre-
gation results in the special case of symbol-complete agendas and compare them
with existing theorems in the literature. Amusingly, the non-dictatorial classes
of functions that arise are precisely the classical logical functions OR, AND, and
XOR.
1. Introduction
In [9], List and Pettit explore the “doctrinal paradox” put forth in Kornhauser
and Sager [8] and prove an impossibility theorem. In their followup work [10], they
contrast their theorem with the celebrated Arrow’s Theorem from the social choice
literature. List-Pettit’s Theorem is about the difficulty of aggregating n judges’
collective judgments on an agenda of logical propositions into a single judgment, and
Arrow’s Theorem is about the difficulty of aggregating n voters’ preference orderings
into a single preference ordering. The “judgment aggregation” framework that comes
out of List and Pettit’s work is very powerful, because logical propositions are very
expressive and flexible.
[10] concludes that while List-Pettit’s theorem is superficially similar to Arrow’s
Theorem, the two theorems are quite different at heart. What, then, is the right
analogue to Arrow’s Theorem in the judgment aggregation framework? Arrow’s
Theorem is typically phrased in the following way: “if n voters wish to obtain a
collective preference on a set of outcomes, then it is impossible for the aggregation
function to be simultaneously Pareto, Indifferent to Irrelevant Alternatives, and Non-
Dictatorial.” In the judgment aggregation literature, Dietrich and List continue
this trend in [2] and [3], proving impossibility theorems that cover a large space of
situations, including explicitly making an analogy with Arrow’s Theorem in [2].
As one persons’ modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, we explore a differ-
ent phrasing of Arrow’s Theorem, which is: “if n voters wish to obtain a collective
preference on a set of outcomes, and the aggregation function must be Pareto and
Indifferent to Irrelevant Alternatives, then it must be a dictatorship function.” That
is, we think of Arrow’s Theorem as a classification theorem rather than an impos-
sibility theorem.
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In this direction, we define an aggregation function of n judgments of X to be
Arrovian if it satisfies Arrow’s Theorem-like constraints. We classify possible Arro-
vian aggregation functions in the case when our agenda X of logical propositions is
symbol-complete and symbol-connected, a condition special enough to give us a lot of
structure but general enough to include many realistic applications. We discover a
friendly set of functions: the OR, AND, and XOR functions from the first chapter
of any undergraduate book on logic or computer science. Here is a simplified para-
phrasing of our main theorem; the details and definitions are made explicit in the
paper:
Theorem (Corollary 5.1, paraphrased). Suppose the agenda X is symbol-complete
and symbol-connected, containing the compound proposition g. If f aggregates the
judgments of n judges on X in an Arrovian manner, then either:
• f is a “dictatorship” (that is, f returns the judgment of a single judge), or
• g must be the OR, AND, or XOR function (or negation), and f is an “oli-
garchy” on a distinguished subset S of judges, obtained by performing the
same function type (or possibly its negation) as g on S.
We now give two examples.
• if n judges are judging on the agenda {The defendant lied, the defendant
misspoke, the defendant committed the crime, the defendant was guilty and
gave false information (i.e. committed the crime and then misspoke or lied)},
logically representable as {P,Q,R, (P ∨ Q) ∧ R}, then the only Arrovian
method to aggregate the n judgments is for the judges to select a single
“dictator” judge to represent the entire group.
• if n judges are judging on the agenda {The defendant committed unspeak-
able crime 1, the defendant committed unspeakable crime 2, the defendant
committed unspeakable crime 3, the defendant committed at least one un-
speakable crime}, logically representable as {P,Q,R, P ∨ Q ∨ R}, then the
Arrovian methods of aggregating the n judgments are for a subset S of the
judges to decide that each proposition is judged true in the aggregate if and
only if at least one of S think the proposition is true (in other words, an OR
function over the judges). Furthermore, if we add to the agenda any other
proposition (besides OR’s) that uses the same symbols (such as Q∧R), then
only the dictatorship option (|S| = 1) is possible. If we add logical OR state-
ments to the agenda (such as P ∨ R), then the OR function over the judges
in S can still be used.
While our main results offer original consequences and insight (the most inter-
esting, in our opinion, being that the aggregation function is forced to follow the
same logical structure as a compound proposition in X, applied to possibly a differ-
ent number of arguments!), they overlap significantly with existing theorems in [3],
so we think of our results primarily as a refinement on the existing work when we
have at least one symbol-closed compound proposition. We would not be surprised,
for example, if our main results would follow from the existing theorems after some
work and case analysis. We believe our paper’s main contribution to the literature
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is actually the act of introducing Fourier analysis techniques, inspired by their suc-
cess in the closely related social choice framework by works such as [7]. Our work
demonstrates that we can prove strong results fairly efficiently with these methods.
In Section 2, we give the preliminaries of Arrow’s Theorem and List-Pettit’s judg-
ment aggregation framework. In Section 3, we abstract the problem and reduce
studying aggregation functions to what we call normal pairs, which are pairs of func-
tions on the Hamming cube that satisfy a commutation-like property. We believe
normal pairs lie at the heart of many social choice / judgment aggregation problems,
and may be very useful in future work. In Section 4, we state and prove our main
result about normal pairs, Theorem 4.6, with Fourier analysis. In Section 5, we apply
Theorem 4.6 to judgment aggregation and put our work in context with the existing
literature, comparing it with existing theorems. Finally, in Section 6, we conclude
with philosophical discussions and ideas for future work.
2. Preliminaries and Definitions
2.1. Arrow’s Theorem. In this paper, we call the framework behind Arrow’s The-
orem the “social choice framework.” In this setup, there is a set of n voters [n] =
{1, 2, . . . , n} voting on a set X of alternatives. We present each voter’s preference
p as a partial order on X, defined as an anti-symmetric, transitive, and reflexive
relation. We denote by P≥ the set of partial orders on X. We then define social
preference functions (SPF’s) to be functions f : P n≥ → P≥. So a SPF aggregates a
profile of n preferences into a single collective preference.
We now define some properties relevant to a SPF f . Suppose f(p1, . . . , pn) = p,
we define f to be:
• A SPF f is Pareto If for all i ∈ N , pi(x) ≥ pi(y), then p(x) ≥ p(y).
• A SPF f has Indifference of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if (p1, . . . , pn) and
(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n) are two profiles in the domain of f and there exists x and y
such that for all i, pi(x) ≥ pi(y) if and only if p
∗
i (x) ≥ p
∗
i (y), then if p =
f(p1, . . . , pn) and p
∗ = f(p∗1, . . . , p
∗
n), we must have p(x) ≥ p(y) if and only if
p∗(x) ≥ p∗(y).
An enlightening restatement of IIA for our purposes is the following: if we think of
a preference p as a function from pairs of alternatives (x, y) to {T, F}, where we say
p(x, y) = T if and only if p ≥ y, then if p′ = f(p1, . . . , pn), it means p
′(x, y) only de-
pends on p1(x, y), . . . , pn(x, y). In other words, for all pairs (x, y) there exists a func-
tion px,y : {T, F}
n → {T, F} such that p′(x, y) = px,y(p1(x, y), p2(x, y), . . . , pn(x, y)).
We will use this intuition again in the future.
Suppose f is Pareto and IIA. Then we call f Arrovian. We rephrase1 the classical
Arrow’s theorem in the following form:
Theorem 2.1 (Arrow’s Theorem, [1], paraphrased). Let |X| > 2. Suppose f is an
Arrovian SPF, then f is a dictatorship (that is, f(p1, . . . , pn) = pi for some i).
1Usually, Arrow’s Theorem is stated as an “impossibility theorem.” That is, it is impossible for
a social preference function to be Pareto, IIA, and not a dictatorship. Because our main result is
more of a “classification theorem,” that is, listing the types of functions (including dictatorships)
that satisfy Pareto and IIA, we do not use the “impossibility” presentation.
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2.2. The Judgment Aggregation Framework. In the judgment aggregation frame-
work of List and Pettit [9], n judges [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} seek to judge an agenda (set
of logical propositions). In this paper, we define an agenda X to be a subset of
the boolean algebra2 of a symbol set of logical symbols such that X is closed under
negation (i.e. for all x ∈ X, we must have ¬x ∈ X). Given x ∈ X, we call x atomic
if x or ¬x belongs to the symbol set and x compound otherwise.
We usually describe the agenda by a basis X, which contains exactly one of each
of x and ¬x for every x ∈ X; note we can recover the agenda X from the basis
X by adding negations, much in the same way that we can recover a vector space
from the basis by allowing multiplication by scalars. For example, a possible symbol
set could be {P,Q}, with X = {P,¬(P ∧ Q), (P ∨ Q)} and X = {P,¬P, (P ∧
Q),¬(P ∧Q), (P ∨Q),¬(P ∨Q)}. Each judge’s judgment can then be defined as an
assignment of T (True) or F (False) to each proposition in the agenda; formally, a
function X → {T, F}.
If the judges are to make judgments on a proposition, it seems natural for them
(at least some of the time) to also be making judgments on its symbols. For example,
if the judges were to judge on “the defendant committed crime A or crime B,” we
would assume they would also argue about whether the defendant committed the
individual crimes separately. We say that a compound proposition is symbol-closed
if all of its symbols are in X. For example, in X = {P,¬Q,¬P ∧ Q}, (¬P ∧ Q) is
symbol-closed. However, in {Q,P ∧Q}, (P ∧Q) is not symbol-closed.
We say that a set of propositions X is symbol-complete if the symbol set is in X.
Note that when g ∈ X is symbol-closed, g and its symbols form a symbol-complete
subset of X. We denote this subset by Closure(g). For example, Closure(P ∧ Q) =
{P,Q, P ∧Q}.
In this paper, we typically assume our agenda is symbol-complete. This is a very
strong assumption. The existing results in [2] and [3] do not make this assumption
and still hold for very general agendas. Compared to these nice results, our restriction
gives results that are less generally applicable but stronger when applied. We discuss
this trade-off more in Sections 5 and 6.
In the social choice framework, the rationality (i.e. if x ≥ y, y ≥ z, then x ≥
z) of a preference is embedded in the requirement that the preference is a partial
order. In the judgment aggregation framework, we analogously define UX , the fully
rational judgments on X, to be the set of judgments on X such that there exists
some assignment of truth values to the symbol set such that each proposition in the
judgment (as a function of the symbol set) is consistent with the assignment; for
example, a fully rational judgment on (Q,P ∨ Q,P ∧ R) could be {Q : T, (P ∨Q) :
T, (P ∧ R) : F}, corresponding to (Q = T, P = F,R = F ). Note that in a fully
rational judgment, different truth values must be assigned to x and ¬x for all x ∈ X.
From this, we can see that while we care about the agenda X, in UX it suffices to
2In the treatment of [2] and others, the agenda is defined by an arbitrary set related by rules
about which subsets of propositions would imply others, without the need of an underlying set of
logical symbols. Any such set can actually be embedded in a boolean algebra and we choose to do
so in this paper.
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provide judgment on just the basis X; in other words, UX is well-defined. Thus, we
usually look at just the judgment restricted to X instead of X to avoid redundancy,
losing no information. We call the set of functions f : UnX → UX judgment aggregation
rules (JAR’s) on X to aggregate fully rational judgments, as an analogue of social
preference functions being used to aggregate non-cyclic preferences. In [2], JAR’s
are simply called “aggregation rules.” We add “judgment” to disambiguate the many
uses of “aggregation” in this paper.
In a symbol-complete X with m atomic propositions, there is a bijection between
UX and the 2
m assignments of {T, F} to the atomic propositions, as every assignment
of the atomic propositions uniquely extends to a fully rational assignment to the
propositions in X.
2.3. Logic. We define two propositions (or sets) in X to be symbol-disjoint if the
logical symbols the two propositions (or sets) use are disjoint. As an example, A∧B
is symbol-disjoint from C, but not from B ∧ C. Consider a graph GX where the
vertices are the propositions and we draw an edge between two propositions if and
only if they share a symbol. We say that X is symbol-connected if GX is a connected
graph. As an example, if X = {P,Q,R, S, P ∧ Q,R ∨ S}, the set {P,Q, P ∧ Q} is
symbol-disjoint from the set of the other 3 propositions, so the graph GX splits into
two connected components and is therefore not symbol-connected.
Given a set S, let {T, F}S be the set of {T, F}-valued functions on S. One of our
main ideas (which lets us use Fourier analysis) is that we interchangeably think of a
proposition as an element of the boolean algebra and as a {T, F}-valued function on
{T, F}S, where S are the symbols in the proposition. We now make some relevant
notations and definitions:
• For any function g : D → {T, F} where D ⊂ {T, F}S, we say that g is (s-)
pivotal at v if s ∈ S, v ∈ {T, F}S, v′ is defined to be v with the s-indexed
element flipped, and g(v) 6= g(v′). Note this requires both v and v′ to be in
the domain D. Also note that g is s-pivotal at v if and only if it is s-pivotal
at v′ as well.
• In the setup above, we say that s is irrelevant for the function g if g is not
s-pivotal anywhere. We say s is relevant otherwise.
Note that we can assume that any symbol appearing in a compound proposition
g ∈ X must be relevant for g (for example, P is irrelevant to g = (P ∧¬P )∨Q∨R,
but we can simplify g to Q ∨R in this case). This removes some pathological cases.
We say that {vs}s∈S form a set of consistent values for a set of propositions S ⊂ X
if there exist assignments of {T, F} to the symbol set such the induced logical values
of each s ∈ S equals vs. We denote the set of sets of consistent values for S by
Cons(S). Equivalently, a set is in Cons(S) if it is the restriction of some element
in UX to S. For a proposition c and a set of propositions S ⊂ X, we say that c
is determined by S if c can be written as a function from Cons(S) to {T, F}. For
example, P and ¬(Q ∧ R) determine P ∨ (Q ∧ R). A recurring theme is that a
compound proposition is determined by its symbols.
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2.4. Fourier Analysis on the Hamming Cube. We present some elementary
Fourier analysis tools in style of [7] to use in Section 4. See e.g. [13] for a survey,
including what we use here and beyond.
Given a function f : {1,−1}n → {1,−1}, we can decompose the function as
f(s1, . . . , sn) =
∑
R⊂[n]
fˆ(R)sR,
where we define sR =
∏
r∈R sr. These Fourier coefficients fˆ(R) satisfy
∑
R⊂[n] fˆ
2(R) =
1.
Given the desired values of f , we can solve for f via interpolation because the
function
∏
1
2n
(1 ± x1)(1 ± x2) · · · (1 ± xn) returns 1 on a single list (x1, . . . , xn) ∈
{1,−1}n and 0 for all other lists. Doing so for a few key functions gives:
• the constant function is the function ±1, so its only nonzero Fourier coefficient
is fˆ(∅) = ±1.
• the XOR function is the function f(s1, . . . , sn) = (−1)
ns1s2 · · · sn, so its only
nonzero Fourier coefficient is fˆ([n]) = (−1)n.
• the NXOR function is the negation of the XOR function, or f(s1, . . . , sn) =
(−1)n+1s1s2 · · · sn. It also only has a single nonzero Fourier coefficient fˆ([n]) =
(−1)n+1.
• the AND function is the function −1 + 1
2n−1
(1 + s1) · · · (1 + sn), so for all
R 6= ∅, the Fourier coefficient is fˆ(R) = 1
2n−1
. For the empty set we must
subtract the 1 in the beginning to get fˆ(∅) = 1
2n−1
− 1.
• the OR function is the function 1− 1
2n−1
(1− s1) · · · (1− sn), so for all R 6= ∅,
the Fourier coefficient is fˆ(R) = (−1)|R|+1 1
2n−1
. For the empty set we must
add the 1 in the beginning to get fˆ(∅) = 1− 1
2n−1
.
Given a function f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1}, for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and x, y ∈ {1,−1},
we say that f forces y with x at index i if whenever r = (r1, . . . , rn) with ri = x, we
have f = y. In this case, we say argument i is forceable for f . Otherwise, we say
index i is free for f . We say such a function f is forceful if f is forceable at every
index.
Lemma 2.2. Suppose f : {−1, 1}n → {−1, 1} where (n > 1) is a non-constant
forceful function. Then it can be written as
f(r1, . . . , rn) = −c0 + c0
1
2n−1
(1 + c1r1)(1 + c2r2) · · · (1 + cnrn)
for arbitrary choices of c0, c1, . . . , cn ∈ {−1, 1}. In this case, fˆ(S) = c0(
∏
s∈S cs)/2
n−1
for all S 6= ∅, and fˆ(∅) = c0(1/2
n−1 − 1).
Proof. If f is forceful, then f forces some yi ∈ {−1, 1} with xi ∈ {−1, 1} at index
i for all i. We must have all the yi’s equal to a constant y, otherwise we can force
two contradictory results since n ≥ 2 (if xi forces yi and xj forces ¬yi, then we get
a contradiction when looking at any set of arguments including xi and xj in the i-th
and j-th spots, respectively). We now know that f takes the same value y at every
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argument but one (namely, when we pick −xi for each index i. Linear interpolation
of f at the xi then gives the above form. 
In particular, note that OR and AND are forceful functions. For example, the OR
function forces 1 (True) if any argument equals 1, and can be written 1 − 1
2n−1
(1 −
r1) · · · (1− rn).
2.5. The Main Question. Since our goal is an analogue of Arrow’s Theorem, we
now give some analogous definitions in the judgment aggregation framework to the
concepts used in Arrow’s Theorem. We follow the nomenclature of [3].
• A JAR f is Unanimity-Preserving (UP) if for every proposition x ∈ X, if
for all i ∈ [n], pi(x) = T (respectively F ), then f(p1, p2, . . . , pn)(x) = T
(respectively F ).
• A JAR f is Propositionally Independent (PI) if for each proposition x ∈ X
there is a function fx such that
f(p1, . . . , pn)(x) = fx(p1(x), p2(x), . . . , pn(x))
for all (p1, . . . , pn).
These are completely analogous to Pareto and IIA, respectively. As in Section 2,
we say that a judgment aggregation rule is Arrovian if it is both UP and PI. We
mention a couple of similar notions from [9]:
• A JAR f has Anonymity if f is invariant under permutations on the judges.
In other words, rearranging the arguments pi of f(p1, . . . , pn) does not change
the judgment.
• A JAR f has Systematicity if there exists a function f ′ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such
that, for any proposition x ∈ X, f(p1, . . . , pn)(x) = f
′(p1(x), . . . , pn(x)).
These were originally used in List-Pettit’s impossibility theorem in [9]. In Section 5,
we look at some consequences of our main result when an Arrovian JAR is also forced
to have these properties.
The main question, then, is:
For a symbol-complete basis X, what Arrovian JAR’s of X exist?
3. Setting up the Main Problem
We give a few definitions and Lemmas that help us reduce the problem into smaller
parts in prepration for Section 4. If f is an JAR with n judges on a basis X, then
for any subset X ′ ⊂ X, restricting each judgment from X to X ′ gives a function
f ′ : UnX′ → UX′ , which we call the restriction of f to X
′. We make a few observations:
• For any X ′ ⊂ X, if f is an Arrovian JAR on X, the restriction of f to X ′ is
also Arrovian.
• If a set of propositions X is not symbol-connected, then GX decomposes into
a disjoint union GX1 ∪ · · · ∪ GXk of symbol-connected components, and the
set of Arrovian JAR’s for X is in bijection with the cartesian product of the
sets of Arrovian JAR’s on X1, X2, . . . , Xk.
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• In the above decomposition, if X is symbol-complete, then each of the Xi is
also symbol-complete.
The proofs of these observations are obvious and we omit them. The first obser-
vation allows us to freely consider subsets of our agenda without worrying about f .
In particular, we mostly apply this when we analyze Closure(g) for a symbol-closed
compound proposition g. The second and third observations say that instead of do-
ing classifying symbol-complete X directly, we can (and should) limit our attention
to symbol-connected subsets of X, who themselves must be symbol-complete.
Lemma 3.1. If X is symbol-complete and symbol-connected, then every compound
proposition g ∈ X is determined by X\g.
Proof. As g is compound, it is a function of its symbols and thus determined by
its symbols. As X is symbol-complete, X\g contains all the symbols of g and thus
determines X. 
Corollary 3.2. If g is symbol-closed in X, then g is determined by Closure(g)\g.
We warn the reader that the adjectives “symbol-complete” and “compound” in
Lemma 3.1 are necessary, suggesting that the problem is much harder without them.
If X were not symbol-complete, X\g does not have to determine g; e.g. X =
{A ∨ B,B ∨ C}. Even in the symbol-complete X = {A,B,A ∨ B}, the atomic
proposition A is not determined by the other propositions (though e.g. if B = F and
A ∨ B = F , we can deduce A = T , but if B = T and A ∨ B = T we know nothing
about A).
We now give an important and rather surprising lemma that does not depend
on symbol-completeness. Given a function f : {T, F}n → {T, F}, define flip(f) to
be the function f ′ with the same domain and codomain such that f ′(s1, . . . , sn) =
¬f(¬s1, . . . ,¬sn) for all {si}. Note that flip(flip(f)) = f , so flip is an involution on
the space of such functions.
Lemma 3.3. Let y ∈ X depend on x ∈ X. Furthermore, assume that y is determined
by X\y. If f is an Arrovian JAR on X, we must have fy = fx or fy = flip(fx).
Proof. Since y is dependent on x, y must be x-pivotal somewhere. In other words,
there exists consistent judgments pi and pi′ such that pi(x) = T , pi′(x) = F , and
pi(y) 6= pi′(y), but for all other propositions a′ ∈ X, pi(a′) = pi′(a′).
Now, fix (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ {T, F}
n. For each i, if si = T or F respectively, let pi = pi
or pi′ respectively. Let p = f(p1, . . . , pn) be the aggregated judgment. For example,
the following illustrates the aggregation for (s1, . . . , s5) = (T, F, T, F, T ):
pi(a1) pi(a1) pi(a1) pi(a1) pi(a1) → pi(a1)
pi(a2) pi(a2) pi(a2) pi(a2) pi(a2) → pi(a2)
...
...
...
...
... →
...
T F T T F → fx(T, F, T, T, F )
...
...
...
...
... →
...
pi(am) pi(am) pi(am) pi(am) pi(am) → pi(am)
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
w = pi(y) ¬w = ¬pi′(y) w w ¬w → fy(w,¬w,w, w,¬w)
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By construction, all propositions not equal to x or y are identically judged by
all the judgments pi. By UP, this means p(z) = pi(z) = pi
′(z) for all propositions
z /∈ {x, y}. By the constraint that judgments must be logically consistent, if p(x) = T
we must have p = pi (because p and pi match on all the non-y propositions and y
is determined by the other propositions) and if p(x) = F we must have p = pi′. By
construction, the truth values of x and y in (p1, . . . , pn) will either be always equal
(in which case their values in the aggregation are also equal) or always opposite (in
which case their values in the aggregation are also opposite). As we can do this for
all 2n choices of (s1, . . . , sn), we see that for any input in {T, F}
n, the function fy is
always consistently equal to fx (when pi(y) = T ) or the negation of fx applied to the
negation of its input (when pi(y) = F ), so our result is proved. 
Corollary 3.4. Let X be symbol-complete and symbol-connected and f be an Arro-
vian JAR on X. Then for every two propositions x, y ∈ X, we must have fy = fx
or fy = flip(fx).
Proof. Consider every instance of a symbol x (which must be in X since it is symbol-
complete) that appears in a compound proposition y. By Lemma 3.3 and Lemma 3.1,
we have fy = fx or flip(fx). Because GX is symbol-connected, there is a path between
every two propositions using only edges between symbols and compounds (no two
symbols share a symbol, and if 2 compounds share a symbol, they must each have
an edge to the symbol). Thus, because flip() is an involution, any two propositions
must actually be connected by 0 or 1 flip() operation, which is what we desired. 
Corollary 3.5. Let X be symbol-complete and symbol-connected and there exists an
Arrovian JAR f on X. Then there exists X ′ representing the same agenda as X and
fx = fy for all x, y ∈ X
′.
Proof. First, note that replacing a proposition x in X by ¬x preserves X, but f¬x =
flip(fx). For any y ∈ X, define X1 to be all the elements x ∈ X (including y) with
fx = fy and define X2 to be all the elements x ∈ X with fx = flip(fy). Now, we may
replace all the propositions x ∈ X2 by ¬x. The resulting set of propositions X
′ has
the same agenda as X, but now has fx = fy for all x, y ∈ X
′. 
Corollary 3.4 is very strong; it tells us that we can restrict our attention to X
where all the fx’s guaranteed by the PI condition on an Arrovian JAR f are actu-
ally the same function, which means we almost have Systematicity3 (the difference
between our situation and Systematicity is that on X\X, the functions are all flips
of the functions in X), despite assuming only PI. If this happens, we say that the
f is in normal form for X and denote, with abuse of notation, the unified func-
tion f : {T, F}n → {T, F} (that is, fx(s1, . . . , sn) = f(s1, . . . , sn) for all x ∈ X and
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ {T, F}
n).
We now have a very clean and symmetric way to think about how an Arrovian
JAR f interacts with a symbol-closed compound proposition g in X. Closure(g) =
3A similar phenomenon happens in proofs of Arrow’s Theorem (see [6] for a short example),
where potentially different aggregation functions on each “component” are forced to be identical.
In the judgment aggregation framework, equivalent ideas have also been found in e.g. [2] and [3].
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{a1, . . . , am, g} is a symbol-closed and symbol-connected subset of X. Arrange the
n judgments on the m propositions ai in a m × n matrix M , where Mij = pj(ai)
is the judgment of judge j on proposition ai. We can think of g as a function
{T, F}m → {T, F} that takes the values of the ai as input, applied to each column.
Because f is in normal form, we have a function f : {T, F}n → {T, F} applied to
each row. In this setup, we are asking the following two operations to give the same
answer:
• For each row i, we compute f(Mi1,Mi2, . . .) to obtain aggregate propositional
judgments j1, j2, . . . , jm, then compute g(j1, j2, . . . , jm).
• For each column j, we compute g(M1j,M2j , . . .) to obtain aggregate com-
pound judgments k1, k2, . . . , kn, then compute f(k1, k2, . . . , kn).
We make one more reduction. Recall that we assumed all the symbols in g are
relevant to g. Similarly, we can assume all judges are relevant for f by removing
irrelevant judges. To obtain solutions for the general case, all we have to do is to
add an arbitrary number of irrelevant judges back. In fact, a dictatorship is just the
identity function4 with any number of irrelevant judges! Thus, we say that a pair
of boolean functions g : {T, F}m → {T, F} and f : {T, F}n → {T, F} form a normal
pair (g, f) if:
• For all sets of Mij ∈ {T, F}, we have the equation
f(g(M11, . . . ,Mm1), . . . , g(M1n, . . . ,Mmn)) = g(f(M11, . . . ,M1n), . . . , f(Mm1, . . . ,Mmn)).
• Every index i ∈ [m] is relevant for g.
• Every index j ∈ [n] is relevant for f .
• Neither g nor f is the constant function (this restriction does not rule out
anything interesting for our purposes. We want f to be UP, so it cannot be
constant. We want g to be a compound proposition, which also cannot be
constant if all its symbols are relevant).
Thus, studying compound propositions really come down to studying normal pairs.
To be explicit, when we have an Arrovian JAR f on a (not necessarily symbol-
complete or symbol-connected!) basis X, each symbol-closed compound proposition
g ∈ X gives a Closure(g) ⊂ X, on which we can assume f is in normal form. We
then know (g, f) is a normal pair where f is UP. Our main question is, then, the
following slight generalization (removing f ’s UP requirement):
What normal pairs (g, f) exist?
4This observation allows us to think about Arrow’s Theorem in another way, which is “if we have
at least 3 alternatives, then the only Arrovian SPF f where all the voters are relevant is the identity
function {T, F} → {T, F}.”
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4. The Main Theorem
We now classify normal pairs (g, f) with the aid of some elementary Fourier anal-
ysis5 on Boolean functions. In this section, we think of T as 1 and F as −1, so we
consider g and f as functions g : {1,−1}m → {1,−1} and f : {1,−1}n → {1,−1}
respectively.
As before, we encode the normal pair as a (m + 1) × (n + 1) matrix where each
cell in the last row corresponds to g applied to the cells above it and each cell in the
last column corresponds to f applied to the cells to the left of it. Being a normal
pair, the last row and the last column are consistent with f and g respectively.
M11 M12 · · · M1n → x1
M21 M22 · · · M2n → x2
...
...
. . .
... →
...
Mm1 Mm2 · · · Mmn → xm
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
y1 y2 · · · yn → z.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose (g, f) form a normal pair. Then consider any subset U ⊂
[m] × [n]. For each r ∈ [m], let Yr = {s ∈ [n] | (r, s) ∈ U}, and for each s ∈ [n], let
Xs = {r ∈ [m] | (r, s) ∈ U}. Now, define
RU = {r ∈ [m] | for some y, (r, y) ∈ U}, SU = {s ∈ [n] | for some x, (x, s) ∈ U}.
Then we have
(
∑
S′⊃SU
fˆ(S ′)gˆ(∅)|S
′−SU |)(
∏
s∈SU
gˆ(Xs)) = (
∑
R′⊃RU
gˆ(R′)fˆ(∅)|R
′−RU |)(
∏
r∈RU
fˆ(Yr)).
Proof. For a subset U ⊂ [m] × [n], we fill the upper-left [m] × [n] submatrix of M
with 1’s and (−1)’s such that we place a 1 at Mij if and only if (i, j) ∈ U . For a
normal pair, we need:
f(g(M11, . . . ,Mm1), . . . , g(M1n, . . . ,Mmn)) = g(f(M11, . . . ,M1n), . . . , f(Mm1, . . . ,Mmn)).
Expanding the left-hand side, we get
f(
∑
R⊂[m]
gˆ(R)
∏
r∈R
Mr1, . . . ,
∑
R⊂[m]
gˆ(R)
∏
r∈R
Mrn)
=
∑
S⊂[n]
fˆ(S)
∏
s∈S
(
∑
R
gˆ(R)
∏
r∈R
Mrs).
Consider the coefficient of the term MU =
∏
(i,j)∈U Mij in this expression. In the
outermost sum, we must select S such that S ⊃ SU , otherwise it would be impossible
to get all the terms. After a S ⊃ SU is selected, for each s ∈ S in the product, we
must pick R = ∅ for s /∈ SU and R = Xs for s ∈ SU . Each ∅ contributes gˆ(∅) and
each Xs contributes gˆ(Xs). As the same Xs for each choice of S, they can be factored
5We have also obtained the relevant results, Propositions 4.3 and 4.5, with purely combinatorial
proofs, but we decided to showcase the Fourier analysis proofs because our emphasis is on the
techniques being new.
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out, and we obtain the left-hand side of our expression. Looking for the coefficient
of MU in the right-hand side of the original equation gives a similar expression. As
the MU form a basis of functions {1,−1}
[m]×[n] → {1,−1}, the two coefficients must
equal for all U , which gives our result. 
Picking an R ⊂ [m] and S ⊂ [n] and letting U be the rectangle R×S in Lemma 4.1,
we immediately obtain:
Corollary 4.2. Suppose (g, f) form a normal pair. Then for all nonempty R ⊂ [m]
and S ⊂ [n],
(
∑
S′⊃S
fˆ(S ′)gˆ(∅)|S
′−S|)gˆ(R)|S| = (
∑
R′⊃R
gˆ(R′)fˆ(∅)|R
′−R|)fˆ(S)|R|.
Note that if either m or n equals 1, the problem is almost trivial: one function
(the function with a single argument) must be the identity or the negative identity
function (to make its only index relevant, the function cannot be constant), and the
other function can be any function where every index is relevant. Thus, it suffices
to consider only the case where m > 1 and n > 1. We call these nontrivial normal
pairs.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose (g, f) form a nontrivial normal pair and g is the XOR
or NXOR function. Then f is also the XOR or NXOR function.
Proof. Recall that g has gˆ([m]) = ±1 and all other coefficients equal to 0. Take a
maximal (under set inclusion) S ⊂ [n] such that fˆ(S) 6= 0. This means summing
S ′ ⊃ S in Corollary 4.2 only picks up fˆ(S). Corollary 4.2 applied to R = [m] and S
then gives fˆ(S) = ±fˆ(S)m. Since m > 1, fˆ(S) = ±1. Thus, fˆ(S) must be the only
nonzero Fourier coefficient in fˆ . Because every index is relevant in fˆ , we must have
S = [n], else there would be a symbol not appearing in the Fourier expansion of f .
This shows that f is indeed the XOR function (or its negation). 
We are now ready to justify why we singled out XOR with Proposition 4.3:
Proposition 4.4. Suppose (g, f) form a nontrivial normal pair. Then one of these
must hold:
• Both g and f are the XOR or NXOR functions.
• Both g and f are forceful functions.
Proof. To start, we assume neither g or f are the XOR or NXOR functions (which,
as we know from Proposition 4.3, would force the other function to also be of this
form). We now show a contradiction arises if either of the functions (without loss of
generality, f) is not forceful. This means we can assume that some index (without
loss of generality, n), is free for f .
We claim that for some i and x ∈ {1,−1}m, g is not i-pivotal at x. Otherwise,
g is i-pivotal at every point for every index; it is easy to see by induction that only
XOR and NXOR have this property, which we ruled out. Without loss of generality,
we can assume i = m. Because all the indices are relevant for g, there must also
be at least one x ∈ {1,−1}m such that g is m-pivotal at x. Thus, we can conclude
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that g is not m-pivotal at some (s1, . . . , sm−2, sm−1, ∗) but g is m-pivotal at some
(s′1, . . . , s
′
m−2, s
′
m−1, ∗). We now define some more values:
(1) Since every index is relevant for f , there is some z1, . . . , zn−1 such that f is
n-pivotal at (z1, . . . , zn−1, ∗).
(2) For each 1 ≤ i ≤ (m−1), because index n is free for f , there exist (xi,1, . . . , xi,n−1)
such that f(xi,1, . . . , xi,n−1, si) = s
′
i.
(3) Let sm be arbitrary and s
′
m = f(z1, z2, . . . , zn−1, sm).
We construct the following evaluation of (g, f):
x1,1 x1,2 · · · x1,n−1 s1 → s
′
1
x2,1 x2,2 · · · x2,n−1 s2 → s
′
2
...
...
. . .
...
... →
...
xm−2,1 xm−2,2 · · · xm−2,n−1 sm−2 → s
′
m−2
xm−1,1 xm−1,2 · · · xm−1,n−1 sm−1 → s
′
m−1
z1 z2 · · · zn−1 sm → s
′
m
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
j1 j2 · · · jn−1 jn → j.
Here, the rows are correct by our choices of x∗,∗ and z∗ and we evaluate the j∗ by
evaluating g.
Now, change sm to ¬sm in the (m,n)-entry of the matrix. Because g is not m-
pivotal at (s1, . . . , sm−1, ∗), jn does not change. As the first (n − 1) columns were
unaffected, the other ji do not change either, so j remains constant. However,
because f is n-pivotal at (z1, . . . , zn−1, ∗), the (m,n + 1)-entry changes from s
′
m to
¬s′m. Because g is m-pivotal at (s
′
1, . . . , s
′
m−1, ∗), the last column forces j to change
to ¬j. This gives a contradiction. 
Proposition 4.5. Suppose (g, f) form a nontrivial normal pair where g and f are
forceful functions. Then g can only be the AND function (resp. the OR function); f
must also be the AND function (resp. the OR function).
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, we can find c∗ and d∗, all in {−1, 1}, such that
g(r1, . . . , rm) = −c0 + c0
1
2m−1
(1 + c1r1)(1 + c2r2) · · · (1 + cmrm),
f(r1, . . . , rn) = −d0 + d0
1
2n−1
(1 + d1r1)(1 + d2r2) · · · (1 + dnrn).
The Fourier coefficients of g are gˆ(R) = c0cR
2m−1
(where cR =
∏
r∈R cr) for all R 6= ∅ and
gˆ(∅) = c0(1/2
m−1− 1); in particular, we know fˆ(R) 6= 0 for all R. We obtain similar
conditions for fˆ(S). Apply Corollary 4.2 to R = [m] and nonempty S to obtain:
(
∑
S′⊃S
fˆ(S ′)gˆ(∅)|S
′−S|)(
c0c[m]
2m−1
)|S| = gˆ([m])fˆ(S)m.
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Pick any row r ∈ [m] and let R = [m]\r. Because m > 1, R is nonempty. Corol-
lary 4.2 gives:
(
∑
S′⊃S
fˆ(S ′)gˆ(∅)|S
′−S|)(
c0c[m]\r
2m−1
)|S| = (gˆ([m]\r) + gˆ([m])fˆ(∅))fˆ(S)m−1.
The left-hand sides of the two equations differ (multiplicatively) by c
|S|
r . Dividing
the right-hand sides (using the fact that fˆ(S) is nonzero), we obtain:
gˆ([m]\r) + gˆ([m])fˆ(∅) = fˆ(S)gˆ([m])c|S|r ,
gˆ([m]\r)
gˆ([m])
+ fˆ(∅) = fˆ(S)c|S|r ,
cr + c0(
1
2n−1
− 1) =
d0dSc
|S|
r
2n−1
,
(2n−1)(cr − c0) = d0dSc
|S|
r − c0.
Since n > 1 and c0 has the same parity as cr, the left-hand side is divisible by 4. The
right-hand side can only take values in {−2, 0, 2}, so we must have cr = c0. Since
r was arbitrary, we know that all the ci’s equal; this means g must be the AND (if
all ci equal 1) or the OR function (if all ci equal −1). By symmetry, all the di’s also
equal, meaning f must also be the AND or OR function. It is easy to check that f
is AND if and only if g is AND. 
Combining our work in this section, we obtain our main result:
Theorem 4.6. Suppose (g, f) form a nontrivial normal pair. Then only the following
cases are possible:
• g and f are both AND functions.
• g and f are both OR functions.
• each of g and f are the XOR or NXOR functions.
5. Comparison with Existing Literature
In this section, we use Theorem 4.6 about normal pairs to produce some judgment
aggregation results. We compare them to existing theorems in the literature of [9],
[2], and [3].
5.1. Arrow’s Theorem. First, recall that normal pairs required all the arguments
in each functions to be relevant. We can easily reverse this requirement on judges to
obtain the following Corollary, which is a closer analogue to Arrow’s Theorem:
Corollary 5.1. Suppose X is symbol-complete and symbol-connected. Then if f is
an Arrovian JAR in normal form for X, at least one of the following must hold:
• |X| = 1, in which case f can be any UP function.
• f is a dictator for a single judge i, in which case X can have any propositions.
• |X| > 1 and f is not a dicatorship. Then there is a subset S of judges with
|S| ≥ 2, such that all compound statements in X and f are simultaneusly the
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OR, AND, or XOR (in this case, negations are allowed), where f is applied
to S.
Proof. If there are no compound propositions in X, then we can only be in the first
case. Otherwise, having a compound proposition g and restricting to relevant judges
gives a normal pair (g, f ′) where f ′ is f restricted on the relevant judges. We apply
Theorem 4.6 on (g, f ′), remembering the possibility of irrelevant judges when we go
back to f , and the fact that f must be UP. Note that if |X| > 1 and f is not a
dictatorship, we cannot have more than one compound proposition type because the
OR, AND, and XOR functions are different with 2 or more arguments. 
We now refer the reader to the two closest related theorems in the literature of
Dietrich and List, paraphrased for ease of exposition.
Theorem 5.2 (Theorem 2, [2]). Suppose the agenda X is strongly connected. Then
a JAR is Arrovian if and only if it is a dictatorship.
The notion of strongly connected is fairly strong; we omit it here as we will not
need it later. Compared to Theorem 5.2, our work requires fewer assumptions and
thus finds more JAR’s.
To understand the next result, we give a few definitions from [3]:
• An agenda X is even-number negatable if there is a minimal inconsistent set
Y ⊂ X with a subset Z ⊂ Y of even size such that (Y \Z) ∪ {¬p : p ∈ Z} is
consistent.
• We say that p ⊢∗ q if {p} ∪ Y implies q for some Y ⊂ X consistent with
p and with ¬q. We say that p ⊢⊢∗ q if there is a sequence of propositions
a1 = p, a2, . . . , ak = q ∈ X such that each pi ⊢
∗ pi+1. Finally, we say that
X is semi-blocked if for all propositions p, q ∈ X, [p ⊢⊢∗ q and q ⊢⊢∗ p] or
[p ⊢⊢∗ ¬q and ¬q ⊢⊢∗ p].
Theorem 5.3 (Theorem 2, [3]). Suppose the agenda X is semi-blocked and even-
number negatable. Then if f is an Arrovian JAR, it must be an oligarchy, where
there is a non-empty set S of the judges and a subset D ⊂ X such that for all profiles
(p1, . . . , pn), the aggregated judgement is AND applied to S for propositions in X\D
and OR applied to S for propositions in D.
Theorem 5.3 seems more powerful than Theorem 5.2. The differences between
Theorem 5.3 and our result Corollary 5.1 are:
• We can check that our symbol-closed condition implies that Closure(g) is
semi-blocked, so Theorem 5.3 applies to a wider framework than Corollary 5.1.
• Corollary 5.1 catches the XOR case, which is not even-number negatable.
• Corollary 5.1 obtains additional constraints on the logical structure of the
propositions; i.e. the propositions themselves must look like OR, AND, and
XOR, in addition to the aggregation functions taking that form.
• Corollary 5.1 notes an enforced “duality” between the logical structures of the
propositions and the aggregation functions.
We were unable to immediately derive our Corollary 5.1 from Theorem 5.3. How-
ever, Theorem 5.3 captures a signficant portion of the power of our result. Thus, an
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appropriate role of Corollary 5.1 is as a nontrivial refinement of a special family (the
symbol-closed compound propositions) of Theorem 5.3, giving more explicit infor-
mation to what the propositions and aggregation functions must be in that family.
5.2. Anonymity. We add Anonymity to Corollary 5.1 to get a more restrictive
theorem and then compare it against literature.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose X is symbol-complete and symbol-connected. Then if f is a
JAR satisfying Anonymity and PI in normal form, f must be the OR, AND, or XOR
(or negation) function over all n judges, and each compound proposition g must be
the same function (or negation) over a subset of the symbols.
Proof. First, we may negate f if necessary to ensure f is UP. As f is PI, f is
Arrovian. Thus, Corollary 5.1 applies. Take a compound statement g and its sym-
bols a1, . . . , am. Because of Anonymity, we cannot have any irrelevant judges (since
Anonymity means f is symmetric on its arguments). Thus, the only possible JAR’s
are the OR, AND, and XOR functions (or their negations, as we may have negated
f at the beginning of our proof to make f UP) where the S in Corollary 5.1 must
be the entire set of judges by Anonymity. 
The most relevant theorem from literature is (paraphrased):
Theorem 5.5 (Theorem 3, [3]). Let n be even. If the agenda is blocked, there exists
no JAR f such that Anonymity and PI are both satisfied.
We omit the discussion of blocked here. The relevant point is that some of theX we
allow are blocked and some are not. Thus, Theorem 5.4 complements Theorem 5.5
in the literature, with neither being immediate consequences of the other.
5.3. Systematicity. Systematicity is a much stronger condition than PI:
Theorem 5.6. If X contains at least one symbol-closed compound statement g and
there are n ≥ 2 judges, then there does not exist a JAR f such that Anonymity and
Systematicity are both satisfied.
Proof. Note that if we assume Systematicity (instead of PI), we would also need the
aggregation functions f¬x = flip(fx) to equal fx, by Lemma3.3. By Theorem 5.4, if
suffices to check the OR, AND, and XOR functions (or their negations), and it is
easy to check that none of them work for n ≥ 2. 
This result does strengthen List-Pettit’s original result:
Theorem 5.7 (Theorem 2, [9]). If X contains {P,Q, P ∧Q,¬(P ∧Q)} and n ≥ 2,
then there does not exist a JAR f such that Anonymity and Systematicity are both
satisfied.
However, the work from [2] and [3] basically subsume both of these results. Thus,
our Theorem 5.6 is not a significant contribution to the literature. We present it
mostly as a natural followup to the other results in this section.
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6. Conclusion and Future Direction
We have defined and classified “normal pairs,” inspired by Arrow’s Theorem. We
then obtained some results in the judgment aggregation framework using this con-
cept. We were motivated by the ideal of cooperation and collaboration between
different theoretical fields6.
It is cute that we see our familiar functions OR, AND, and XOR. Furthermore,
we knew from human history that the “at least one yes means yes” (OR) and “at
least one no means no” (AND) rules are reasonable ways7 for people to aggregate
opinions, so it is good that we are not just stuck with dictatorships as in Arrow’s
Theorem.
Our work complements the known results in the judgment aggregation literature
for the special case of symbol-complete and symbol-connected agendas. Because
Arrovian JAR’s stay Arrovian on subsets of the propositions, this also provides in-
formation for agendas containing a subset logically equivalent to a symbol-complete
and symbol-connected agenda. We also show that there is a nice “duality” between
the roles of the logical propositions and aggregation functions, in that they must use
basically the same type of function, but on different numbers of arguments.
Rather than the results themselves, we think the main value of this paper is in-
troducing Fourier-theoretic tools to the standard problems of judgment aggregation.
We use these tools to prove Propositions 4.5 and 4.3. Our proofs are quite short
and self-contained, showcasing the power of Fourier analysis. We emphasized “stan-
dard” because Nehema [12] has done work on “approximate judgment aggregation”
where the logical consistency rules are probabilistically correct, also using Fourier
analysis. Our works have many similarities (a particular agenda Nehema examines
is the conjunction agenda, which is the symbol-closed closure of an AND function).
Another way of introducing probability into the problem is “probabilistic judgment
aggregation,” where the judgments themselves contain probabilistic data represent-
ing confidence levels, such as in [4] and [5]. As Fourier analysis can be used on many
domains, we suspect Fourier-analytical techniques to be potentially useful there as
well.
Compared to the existing literature (which think of logical propositions as ab-
stract set elements, connected by concepts of consistency and inconsistency), our
modelling of propositions as elements in a boolean algebra may seem unnecessary.
However, the algebraic structure was essential to us realizing the duality between
logical propositions and aggregation functions, so we propose it as a useful mental
model to have in this field. We are also not losing generality; for example, we can
embed the voter preferences in the social choice framework for Arrow’s Theorem
as logical propositions: log2(m!) symbols are enough to embed the strict preference
orderings on m candidates (e.g. in some a-priori arbitrary order, (TTT, TTF, . . .)
6Our other recent work in progress in social choice theory with Marengo and Settepanella [11] is
similarly motivated, trying to connect the judgment aggregation and classical social choice theory
frameworks.
7We are less excited about discovering XOR as a practical tool for judgment aggregation.
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can encode (a > b > c, a > c > b, . . .) respectively), and then preferences of the form
(x ≥ y) can be written as binary functions of the preferences.
Our symbol-complete assumption is natural, especially for the “practical” law-
oriented examples brought up by List-Pettit’s original work [9]. However, it is still
limiting, and an obvious direction for fruitful future work would be to emulate [2]
and [3], whose framework extends far beyond symbol-complete assumptions. For
example, our above embedding of the preference orderings does not contain a symbol-
closed proposition, because the judgments are only done on the pairwise preferences
and not the symbols themselves. This means that we do not have an immediate
generalization of Arrow’s Theorem.
More complex functions would appear if we allow agendas which are not symbol-
complete. As an example, let X = {(X ∨Y ), (¬X ∨Y )}. Note that the fully rational
assignments of values to X are exactly those where at least one T is assigned. Then,
consider f that assigns to each x ∈ X the “majority rule” of a subset of the judges.
Because each judge sees at least one T , the overall number of T ’s seen by the relevant
judges is at least 50%, so at least one aggregated value must be T , meaning the result
is also consistent. Thus, we must be ready for stranger functions; [3] finds some of
these functions as well.
We hope that the tools we have created, such as definition of normal pairs and the
Fourier analysis in Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.2, would be useful for future work.
A long-term goal would be an explicit classification of all possible PI aggregation
functions for any agenda of logical propositions.
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